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of them, is not a sale within the meaning of a statute prohibiting any person from
selling by retail intoxicating liquor without a license.

CASE stated by a magistrate upon the conviction of appellant for
selling liquor without a license.
The following were the facts: The Grosvenor Club, situate at 200
Buckingham Palace road, was a bonafide club properly constituted.
Trustees of the club property were appointed, and there was a managing committee to conduct the general business of the club. The
appellant, Graft, was the manager of the club, acting for the said
committee. There were about 1100 members of the club who paid

an entrance fee and periodical subscriptions. The objects of the
club were social intercoarse, mutual and moral improvement, aided
by lectures and rational recreation. One object also was to keep
the members away from the public-house. They could obtain food
and refreshments in the club, and also wine, beer and spirits, on
payment. The produce of such sales went to the fund of the club.
The club had no license to sell. According to the evidence Mr.
James Foster, who was a member of the club and also a licensed
victualler, purchased on the 4th of May last, at the bar of the club,
a bottle of whiskey and a bottle of pale ale, and paid 3.. ld. for the
two. The barman wrapped them up in paper, and Foster, who had.
a friend not a member of the club with him, carried them away
out of the club openly and without concealment. These facts were
admitted by the appellant and his witnesses, and it was also found
that liquor to the value of 2001. was sold annually to the members for
consumption off the premises, and that there was a profit on such
sales to the amount of thirty-three per cent. on the original cost.
The magistrate was of opinion that an ordinary club, such as
the Grosvenor Club, was not a partnership in the legal sense of that
word, not being an association formed for the purpose of realizing
a joint profit, though the members of it might be joint owners; that
so far as the excise authorities were concerned, they seemed to have
regarded these clubs as private households, and not to have interfered with them so long as they were bona fide clubs and the
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liquors belonged to the members only, and were consumed on the
premises, and that no inquiry was made as to its dealings within its
own walls ; that this case, viz., selling liquor to a member to carry
off the premises, went beyond these limitations, and that the question arose whether this did not amount to a trading within the
meaning of the' act. The magistrate was of opinion that the answer
tp this question depended upon another, namely, did the club
derive a profit from this outside selling? that if the price charged
was only the strict cost to the club and no profit was made, it would
not amount to a sale within the act; that it would only be a mode
of subdivision among the members; that the club committee Would
only be the agent of the members to purchase, and the member in
that case would merely repay his agent the cost price; that the
transaction would be similar to that of a subscription dinner or
picnic; .where one man purchases the wine or beer for all, and each
afterwards contributes in proportion to what he takes, but if a profiI
is made by the first buyer by charging more than the cost price to
the consumers that would amount to a sale; that in the present
case a considerable profit, as much as thirty-three per cent. on the
,original cost, resulted to the club; that in answer to the objection
made on behalf of the appellant that the profit did not benefit any
individual in a pecuniary way, but only helped to maintain the club,
the magistrate was of opinion that it was equally a profit of which
the members had the advantage ; that Foster, though a member,
bought the liquor in his individual and separate capacity, and was
liable for the amount to the committee ; that, even if apartriership
were admitted, it would make no difference in this respect.
The question of law for the opinion of the court was whether
the sale in question of whiskey and ale to Foster was a sale of
intoxicating liquor by retail within the meaning of sect. 3 of
the Licensing Act, 1872, requiring the seller to be duly licensed.
The Intoxicating Liquors Act, 1872, sect. 3, provide that "No
person shall sell or expose for sale by retail any i ntoxicating liquor
without being duly licensed to sell the same, or at any place where
he is not authorized by his license to sell the same. Any person
selling or exposing for sale by retail any intoxicating liquor which
he is not licensed to sell by retail, or selling or exposing for, sale
any intoxicating liquor at any place where he is not authorized by
his license to sell the same, shall be subject to the following penalties ," (whih were fine or imprisonment.
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Sir F. Hershell, S. G. ( A. D. Smith, with him).
Staveley Rill, Q. 0. (Sir Iardinge Giffard, Q. C., and Bremner with him),
have come to the conclusion that the question
FIELD, J.-I
which the magistrate asks us, "whether the sale in question of
whiskey and ale to Foster was a sale within the meaning of section
3 of the Licensing Act, 1872, requiring the seller to be duly
licensed," must be answered in the negative. The introduction of
the word sale in that qaestion is, of course, only inserted for convenience of expression, because if this is decided to be a sale, there
have
is no question for us. The act which the appellant is said to introfor the first time
which
1872,
Act,
Licensing
the
is
infringed
duced the words with which we have to deal to-day. Section 3
creates a distinct offence for wyhich the person committing it is liable
to a penalty; fherefore it is an act imposing penalties, and before
we can say a man is liable under it, we must see that he is clearly
within it. The facts are very short, the case (which the learned
judge read) shows a special property in the manager other than
the general property in the trustees. He was a manager of the
club, acting for the committee who, we know, were the persons
refreshments on paybuying the wines, &c. Members can obtain
ment, and the produce of such sales goes to the funds of the club,
and the case finds there was a profit on the annual sales. If that
means profit in a commercial sense, it would be an important element in the case, but the meaning I attribute to the words of the
magistrate is that out of every 1001. worth sold 331. was the proportion of club expenses.
It is next argued that the magistrate, although he does not find
there was a partnership, yet finds all the members were joint owners,
and I think properly so-i. e., the members had a general property
in all the property of the club, with special property in the trustees,
and another special property in the committee. The magistrate
states that the question of trading depends on another, whether
there was any profit. I must confess that I am not able to follow
that reasoning, that it would be a sale if the price be more than the
cost price, yet would not if equal or less. That seems to me not following out the true principles of the act. We must find out the meaning of the legislature from the words of the act. Reading them, I
come to the conclusion that the legislature thought it was undesir-

GRAFF v.EVANS.

able that intoxicating liquors should be sold without a license, but
it places no limit qn any one giving them away, nor does it touch
the wholesale man ; it relates only to sale by retail. The question
for us is, did Graff sell by retail ? Undoubtedly his was the hand
which delivered over the whiskey and ale, but I do not think it
was a sale; it really was this: there was a right in every individual
member so to receive goods, it was not a new contract, it was part
of any member's original contract on joining the club that he
should come in and eat and drink and carry away on payment, but
on such payment there was no new contract. No one here could
have maintained an action against Foster for goods sold and delivered. If it had been a sale, Foster was as much a seller as any
other member of the club. I am inclined to think that it was a
transfer of property, but not in the nature of a sale, or contract
of sale, and that therefore the magistra-te's decision must be reversed
with costs.
Conviction quashed with costs.
HUDDLESTON,

B., delivered a concurring opinion.

A different view seems to have been
taken by Judge LOWELL, District
Judge of the United States District
Court of Massachusetts, in United States
v. Wittig, 2 Low. 466. There a club or
association of persons was formed, but
not incorporated, to promote social and
literary objects, and bought lager beer
at wholesale, and the members of the
club and others were permitted to take
beer at the rooms of the club, upon giving as many checks as they received
glasses of beer. The checks cost the
members five cents each, and the price
was intended to cover the cost of the
beer, though there was sometimes a
small profit. The question was whether
the club was to be considered a retail
dealer, or dealers, in malt liquors, so as
to be liable to an annual revenue tax,
under chap. 36, sect. 18, of the United
,States Statutes of 1875, vol. 18, p. 311.
LOWELL, ,., held that it was.
"There
seems to be no doubt, said he, "that
the club sells tle beer to its members.
Every element of a sale is present; the
delivery of beer on the one part, and the

payment on the other.
It was argued
that, at common law, a man cannot buy
of himself and others. This is a mistake. The common law recognises such
a sale, though, if tle contract is executory, the common law has no mode of
enforcing it.
The true question is,
whether such sales make the association
a dealer under the statute. * * * This
is a revenue law, and the decisions of
the Supreme Cout require us to consstrue it liberally in favor of the revenue,
to prevent evasions.
So construed, I
think it must be held that any course of
selling, though to a restricted class of
persons, and without a view to profit, is
within its meaning. It may be that a
court ought to give the same word a
more limited meaning in a penal statute,
intended to punish public immorality,
than in one intended for raising revenue."
IA somewhat similar question arose
recently in Massachusetts under a penal
statute. Several persons formed a club,
of which the defendant, James Smith,
was a member ; they advanced a certain
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sum of money each, which was put into
a common fund; the defendant was
chosen agent of the club, and under instructions of the club purchased liquors
and refreshments for the club; th fund
was taken by the defendant and invested
for them, and a certain number of
checks, of the amount of five cents each,
were delivered to 'each member of the
club, to the extent of the money advanced by each; these checks were
transferable only to other members of
Upon presentation of the
the club.
checks by any member to the defendant,
he would deliver to such member the
liquor of the club to the amount of the
check presented. On several occasions
the defendant had delivered liquor to a
particular member of the club upon checks
presented by him. After the distribution of the liquor upon all the checks
issued, to the amount of their face, it
was calculated that about one-fifth of,
tle original purchase remained undisposed of, which excess the defendant, as
such agent, was to have for his services
in selling, and for the use of his room
by the club. The defendant being indicted for a sale to one of the members,
it was held that these facts did not, necessarily, and as a matter of law, constitute a sale of the liquor by the agent
to the members ; but that it was a question of fact for the jury whether this
arrangement was colorable, and a mere
evasion of the law or not. The court
saying: "It certainly might happen,
and not unfrequently has happened, that
a number of persons unite in importing
wines or other liquors from a foreign
country, to be divided between them according to some agreed proportion. It
could not be seriously contended that the
person who should receive liquors so
imported, at his place of business, and
make or superintend the division among
the contributors to the purchase-money,
is a seller of intoxicating liquors, or that

they buy the liquors of him. It is difficult to see how it could make any -difference that the liquors are of various'kinds,
and were purchased in this country instead of being imported from abroad, or
that the person who is to make the distribution delivers them in small quantities
and keeps his account by means of tickets
orchecks. If the liquors really belongcd
to members of the club, and had been
previously purchased by them, or on
their account, of some person other than
the defendant, and if he merely kept the
liquors for them, and to divide among
them according to some previous arranged system, these facts would not
justify a jury in finding that the defendant kept and maintained a nuisance for
the illegal keeping and sale of intoxicating liquors under Gen. Stat., ch. 87, p.
6. There could be neither a selling nor
a keeping for sale. On the other hand,
if the whole arrangement was a mere evasion, and the substance of the transaction
was a tendering of money to defendant,
that he might buy intoxicating liquors to
be afterwards sold and charged to the
associates, or if he was authorized to sell
amd did sell, or keep any of the liquors
with intent to sell to any persons not
members of the club, he might well be
convicted. This, however, would be a
question not of law but of fact, and
would fall wholly within the province of
the jury :" Commonwealth v. Smith, 102
Mfass. 144.
Similar views to those of Commonwealth
v. Smith, were also adopted in Seim v.
The State, 55 Md. 566, in which it was
held that the officers of a social club were
not guilty of selling beer to tie member
to whom it was delivered by the steward
of the club, at a fixed price per glass.
But the contrary opinion, and more in
accordance with Judge LowELL's decision, prevailed in Mfarmont v. The State,
48 Ind. 21 ; State v. Mercer, 32 Iowa
ED3sUxND I. BENNETT.
405.

